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1Energy-Constrained SWIPT Networks: Enhancing
Physical Layer Security With FD Self-Jamming
Xuanxuan Tang, Yueming Cai, Senior Member, IEEE, Yansha Deng, Member, IEEE,
Yuzhen Huang, Member, IEEE, Wendong Yang, and Weiwei Yang, Member, IEEE
Abstract—In this paper, we investigate the secrecy performance
of energy-constrained wireless powered networks with consider-
ing the passive eavesdropping scenario, where the simultaneous
wireless information and power transfer based full-duplex self-
jamming (SWIPT-FDSJ) scheme is developed. The maximal ratio
transmission (MRT) protocol is applied at the multi-antenna
source such that the wireless signals are designated to the
destination directly. Besides, the energy harvesting and full-
duplex (FD) self-jamming operations are adopted at the energy-
constrained destination to prolong its lifetime as well as to confuse
the eavesdropper. Specifically, the exact and asymptotic closed-
form expressions of the connection outage probability (COP), the
secrecy outage probability (SOP), and the secrecy throughput of
the proposed system are obtained, based on which we optimize
the time-switching ratio to maximize the secrecy throughput.
We also degenerate the proposed SWIPT-FDSJ scheme to the
reduced half-duplex with no self-jamming (HDNSJ) scheme. The
finds suggest that in the HDNSJ scheme, adding the antenna
number of the source only benefits the COP performance, but
has no impact on the SOP performance. By contrast, it will
promote the COP and SOP performance at the same time in
the SWIPT-FDSJ scheme, which eventually results in the great
improvement of secrecy throughput. In addition, we present the
practical application condition of the SWIPT-FDSJ scheme. It
is demonstrated that the secrecy throughput performance of the
SWIPT-FDSJ scheme is much superior to the HDNSJ scheme on
condition that the application condition is satisfied.
Index Terms—Energy harvesting, maximum secrecy through-
put, secrecy outage probability, time-switching ratio, optimal
application condition.
I. INTRODUCTION
DUE to the broadcast nature of the wireless medium, itis important to address the security issue of wireless
communication in practical system designs. Traditionally, the
security is enhanced by encryption at higher layers [1, 2].
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However, with the rapid development of the computing capa-
bility, the cryptography-based methods could not ensure the
absolute security any longer. Fortunately, the physical layer
security technique has emerged recently and is deemed to serve
as a good supplement of current cryptographic mechanism.
The notion of physical layer security was first proposed by
Shannon in 1949 [3] and then significantly promoted by
Wyner in 1975 [4]. The basic idea of Wyner is to secure the
proposed wiretap channel model by taking advantage of the
difference between the physical channels of authorized user
and malicious eavesdropper. Since then, enormous researches
based on Wyner’s notion have been carried out in various
networks, like cellular networks [5], cognitive radio (CR) net-
works [6], wireless sensor networks (WSNs) [7], and a variety
of scenarios with single-antenna [8], multi-antenna [9, 10],
multiple-input-single-output (MISO) [11] and multiple-input-
multiple-output (MIMO) [12, 13], etc.
Practically, the lifetime of wireless devices may be greatly
limited by the capacity of their batteries [14]. Except for
increasing the battery capacity, there is a strong desire to
exploit effective remote charging technologies in some energy-
constrained networks like WSNs [15, 16], wireless body area
networks (WBANs) [17, 18], etc. Hence, the simultaneous
wireless information and power transfer (SWIPT) has recently
gained much attention, because it is regarded as a promising
technique to transmit both energy and information by the
same electromagnetic wave [19]. For example, [20] studied the
wireless energy and information transfer trade-off for limited
feedback multiantenna systems, where the adaptive energy
beamforming was proposed according to the instantaneous
channel state information (CSI) for maximizing the harvesting
energy. However, the current circuits for wireless energy har-
vesting can not extract information from the signals [21]. This
has triggered extensive study on two prevalent types of energy-
harvesting receivers, namely the time-switching (TS) receivers
[22, 23] and the power-splitting (PS) receivers [24, 25], where
part of the time or power of the received signal is allocated
to energy harvesting and the remaining part is used for
information processing, respectively.
Recently, the physical layer security of SWIPT networks
has received increasing attention [26–28]. In [26], the se-
crecy performance of a single-input multiple-output (SIMO)
SWIPT system was studied, where the base station transmits
information to a desired information receiver and at the same
time transfers energy to multiple energy-harvesting receivers.
Under the assumption that the information may be wiretapped
by the energy-harvesting receivers, the authors derived the
2closed-form expressions for the secrecy outage probability
and the average secrecy capacity, respectively. The authors
in [27] proposed a robust secure transmission scheme for
MISO SWIPT networks. Taking into account the channel un-
certainties, the worst-case secrecy rate was maximized under
transmit power constraint and energy-harvesting constraint. An
efficient transmission solution for MIMO wiretap channels
were presented in [28], where the non-concave problem was
firstly converted into a convex optimization, and then was
tackled by handling its dual problem.
The physical layer security of SWIPT networks is expected
to be further enhanced when jamming operation is exploit-
ed [29, 30]. The authors in [31] studied the robust secure
transmission with a cooperative jammer helping to confuse the
eavesdropper, and the destination harvesting the energy from
both the source and the jammer. In [32], the power allocation
strategy was investigated to strengthen the security of SWIPT
systems with a FD jammer. In this paper, an external jammer
is required to be deployed and the energy receiver not only
harvests energy but also acts as an eavesdropper.
Other works have looked at the scenarios where additional
external jammer is unavailable and the user within the network
harvests energy and acts as jammer itself [33–35]. In [33],
the secrecy performance of FD SWIPT networks with the PS
protocol was studied. A SWIPT transmission system with FD
self-jamming was analyzed in [34] in the presence of a passive
eavesdropper. In [35], the authors extended the research in
the CR networks, where the energy collected by the receiving
antenna is used for producing jamming signals. However, [33–
35] only considered the single-antenna scenario, which would
be not practical any longer when applied to the multi-antenna
cases. Moreover, only [34] considered the performance opti-
mization, which was only addressed by numerical simulations,
and no exact demonstration for the existence of the optimum
point was provided.
In this paper, we propose a new paradigm to strengthen the
physical layer security for the energy-constrained SWIPT net-
works, where the SWIPT based full-duplex (FD) self-jamming
(SWIPT-FDSJ) scheme is developed. More specifically, the FD
self-jamming is designed to confuse the eavesdropper while
the SWIPT is to proposed prolong the lifetime of the energy-
constrained destination node1. Moreover, the maximal ratio
transmission (MRT) protocol is exploited at the source node
so that the signals could be designated to the destination node
directly. The main contributions are summarized as follows:
• We derive the exact closed-form expressions for the
connection outage probability (COP), the secrecy outage
probability (SOP), and the secrecy throughput, respec-
tively. The theoretical results can indicate the impacts
of the system parameters on the secrecy performance of
proposed networks.
1We note that, by using the extensively investigated artificial noise at
the source is expected to improve the secrecy performance of the network.
However, this paper has attempted to explore what effective methods could be
taken by a wireless-powered legitimate user to further increase the network
security as much as possible even when the eavesdropper’s CSI is unknown.
The combining of artificial noise and self-jamming operations in the SWIPT
networks to mutually promote the secrecy performance would be interesting
and will be explored in the future.
TABLE I
LIST OF FUNDAMENTAL VARIABLES
Symbol Description
NS Antenna number of S
T0 Packet/block time duration
α Time-switching ratio
ha,b Channel coefficient between a and b
γ¯a,b Average channel power gain of ha,b
ha,b Channel coefficient vector between a and b
hI Self-interference channel coefficient
γ¯I Average channel power gain of hI
h˜I Self-interference channel coefficient after SIC
˜¯γI Average channel power gain of h˜I
θ Amount of SIC in dB
da,b Distance between a and b
µ Path loss factor
PS Transmit power of S
PJ Transmit power of jamming signal
N0 Variance of AWGN
η Energy conversion efficiency
ω ω = α/(1− α)
Rt Transmit rate per channel use
Rs Secrecy rate per channel use
γtth Predefined threshold γ
t
th = 2
Rt − 1
γeth Predefined threshold γ
e
th = 2
Rt−Rs − 1
PCO Connection outage probability
PSO Secrecy outage probability
ς Secrecy throughput
• As the transmit signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) and the self-
interference cancellation (SIC) goes to infinity, we derive
the asymptotic expressions of the COP, the SOP, and the
secrecy throughput. Moreover, the asymptotic analytical
results are validated by the simulations.
• As the self-interference cancellation (SIC) goes to in-
finity, we further discuss the problem of time allocation
optimization, and then obtain the optimal time-switching
ratio. We point out that with the given application condi-
tion satisfied, the secrecy throughput performance of the
proposed scheme is superior to the reduced half-duplex
with no self-jamming (HDNSJ) scheme.
The remainder of the work is organized as follows: Sec-
tion II describes the system model and presents the secure
transmission scheme. Section III presents the exact secrecy
analysis of the proposed scheme. In section IV, the asymptotic
analysis under two different scenarios are carried out. Section
V investigates the issue of optimal time switching ratio.
Simulation results are provided in Section VI, and Section
VII summarizes the contributions of this paper.
Notation: Throughout this paper, the boldface uppercase let-
ters are used to denote matrices or vectors. (·)H is denoted as
the conjugate transpose operation. Fγ (·) and fγ (·) represent
the cumulative distribution function (CDF) and the probability
density function (PDF) of random variable γ, respectively. E[·]
denotes the expectation operation. A list of the fundamental
variables is provided in Table I.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. System Description
We consider the secrecy performance of the network as
depicted in Fig. 1, which consists of a source S, a destination
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Fig. 1. System Model
D, and a potential eavesdropper E. S is equipped with NS
antennas, D and E are both deployed with a single receiving
antenna. Specifically, D is equipped with an extra transmitting
antenna to enable the FD operation2. We assume that S
knows the channel state information (CSI) of D, but has no
knowledge about the CSI of E. This is a typical passive
eavesdropping scenario, where the malicious eavesdropper
may be totally concealed thus it does not feedback its CSI to
the source [12, 38]. We assume that all the channels undergo
quasi-static Rayleigh fading, such that the channel coefficients
keep constant during a packet time T0 but vary independently
from one packet time to another.
B. Secure Transmission: SWIPT and FD Self-Jamming
The SWIPT and FD self-jamming scheme is proposed for
safeguarding the data transmission. In more detail, we apply
the time-switching SWIPT technology at the destination to
extend its battery lifetime [22], where each block time T0
is split into two phases, namely, the energy harvesting (EH)
phase with time period αT0 and the information receiving (IR)
phase with time period (1− α)T0, and α ∈ [0, 1] is the time-
switching ratio.
In the EH phase, S transmits the energy-bearing signals to
D using maximal ratio transmission (MRT)3 to increase the
harvested energy. Thus, the received signal at D in EH phase
is expressed as
yEHD =
√
PShSD (wSDx1) + nD, (1)
where PS is the transmit power of S, hSD ∈ C1×NS repre-
sents the channel coefficient vector between S and D, with its
element hSiD ∼ CN (0,
√
γ¯SD)
4, wSD = (hSD)
H
/‖hSD‖
is the weight vector of MRT, x1 denotes the energy-bearing
signal with E
[
|x1|2
]
= 1, and nD represents the additive
white Gaussian noise (AWGN) at D with zero mean and
variance N0. Hence, the collected energy at D during EH
2Similar FD deployment has been adopted in numerous works [36, 37].
3The CSI for MRT may be imperfect, which will degrade the effect of MRT
operation. The imperfect CSI has been extensively investigated by introducing
the channel estimation error variable in the channel modeling [39–41], which
will be treated in future works.
4We note that the large-scale path loss is modeled as E
[
γ¯a,b
]
= d−µa,b ,
where da,b is the distance of link a − b, µ represents the path loss factor
[6, 7, 42].
phase can be written as5
εD = ηαT0PS |hSDwSD|2, (2)
where η denotes the energy conversion efficiency.
In the IR phase, the information-bearing signals are trans-
mitted from S to D, which may be intercepted by E. Mean-
while D sends jamming signals using its transmit antenna to
confuse the eavesdropper. We note that the MRT scheme is
still applied at S in this stage to maximize the receiving SNR
at D. As the CSI of E is totally unknown at the legitimate
network, such operation as well as the self-jamming in fact
attempts to guarantee the best secrecy performance in the data
transmission. As a result, the received signals at D and E in
IR phase are given by
yIRD =
√
PShSD (wSDx2) +
√
PJhIx0 + nD, (3)
and
yIRE =
√
PShSE (wSDx2) +
√
PJhDEx0 + nE , (4)
where PJ is the jamming power of D, hSE ∈ C1×NS denotes
the channel vector between S and E, with its element hSiE ∼
CN (0,√γ¯SE) and i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , NS}. In (3) and (4), x2 and
x0 are the information-bearing signal and the jamming signal
with E
[
|x2|2
]
= E
[
|x0|2
]
= 1, hI is the self-interference
channel at D with E
[
|hI |2
]
= γ¯I , hDE ∼ CN (0,√γ¯DE)
represents the channel between D and E, nE represents the
additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) at E with zero mean
and variance N06.
We assume that the SIC is applied at the FD node D [23,
25, 45]. The receiving signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratios
(SINRs) at D and E are calculated as
γD =
PS |hSDwSD|2
PJ
∣∣∣h˜I ∣∣∣2 +N0 , (5)
and
γE =
PS |hSEwSD|2
PJ |hDE |2 +N0
, (6)
where h˜I is the self-interference channel after SIC. According
to [23, 25], h˜I can be treated as a complex Gaussian random
variable with h˜I ∼ CN
(
0,
√
˜¯γI
)
, where [˜¯γI ]dB = [γ¯I ]dB−θ,
and θ is the amount of SIC in dB. As can be seen from (5)-
(6), the jamming operation plays a dual role in the proposed
scheme, similar as in [46, 47]. On the one hand, the jamming
degenerates the receiving performance of the eavesdropper. On
the other hand, a portion of time duration must be sacrificed
for collecting energy consumed by sending jamming signals.
Furthermore, as described previously, D is an energy-
constrained equipment. Thereby, the jamming power must
be chosen to keep the energy balanced at D statistically in
5We note that little energy can be harvested from the AWGN in practice,
hence is neglected in this paper [23, 24].
6Without any loss of generality, the variance of AWGN at all receivers
within the network is set to be the same [43, 44].
4the long run7. Practically, we choose PJ according to the
following expression [25]
PJ =
E [εD]
(1− α)T0 = ωηPSE
[
|hSDwSD|2
]
, (7)
where ω = α/(1− α) . According to [49], ‖hSDwSD‖2 =∑NS
i=1 |hSiD|2 conforms to Erlang distribution with the ex-
pectation NS γ¯SD. Therefore, the above expression can be
rewritten as
PJ = ωηNS γ¯SDPS . (8)
III. EXACT PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we study the reliability and security perfor-
mance of the SWIPT and FD self-jamming scheme by deriving
the exact expressions of COP, SOP, and secrecy throughput,
respectively.
A. COP and SOP
The COP is defined as the probability of the connection
outage event that the receiving SINR at the legitimate receiver
falls below a predefined threshold γtth, where γ
t
th = 2
Rt −
1 and Rt (bits/s/Hz) is the transmit rate per channel use8.
Mathematically, the COP can be calculated as [6, 51]
PCO = Pr
(
γD < γ
t
th
)
= FγD
(
γtth
)
. (9)
Lemma 1: The COP of the SWIPT and FD self-jamming
system is given by
PCO = 1− N0
ωηNS γ¯SDPS ˜¯γI
NS−1∑
n=0
1
n!
(
N0γ
t
th
PS γ¯SD
)n
e
− N0γ
t
th
PSγ¯SD
×
n∑
n1=0
(
n
n1
)
(n1)!
(
PS γ¯SDωηNS ˜¯γI
ωηNS ˜¯γIN0γ
t
th +N0
)n1+1
.
(10)
Proof: See Appendix A.
The SOP is defined as the probability of the secrecy outage
event that the receiving SINR at the eavesdropper is higher
than a predefined threshold γeth, where γ
e
th = 2
Rt−Rs − 1
and Rs (bits/s/Hz) is the secrecy rate per channel use.
Mathematically, the SOP is defined as [6, 51]
PSO = Pr (γE ≥ γeth) = 1− FγE (γeth) . (11)
Lemma 2: The SOP of the SWIPT and FD self-jamming
system is given by
PSO =
γ¯SE
ωηNS γ¯SDγ¯DEγeth + γ¯SE
e
− N0γ
e
th
PSγ¯SE . (12)
Proof: See Appendix B.
7We note that the energy consumption required by the transmit/receive
circuits at the receiver is negligible in this study [21, 38, 48].
8The design of Rt and the following Rs falls into the construction of
the wiretap coding, which has been elaborated abundantly in the literatures
[4, 6, 50], thus is omitted in this paper.
B. Secrecy Throughput Analysis
In the passive eavesdropping scenario, the CSI of E cannot
be derived by the legitimate network and the perfect secrecy
is not guaranteed. As a consequence, the metric of secrecy
throughput becomes appealing which quantifies the average
rate of the messages that are reliably and securely transmitted.
Mathematically, the secrecy throughput is defined as the equiv-
alent secrecy rate multiplied by the probability of a reliable
and secure transmission, which can be written as [6, 51]
ς= (1− α)RsPR & S , (13)
where the term (1−α) results from the time-switching protocol
at D, and PR&S is defined as
PR & S = Pr
(
γD ≥ γtth, γE < γeth
)
. (14)
Theorem 1: The secrecy throughput for the SWIPT and FD
self-jamming system is given by
ς=
Rs
1 + ω
(
1− γ¯SE
ωηNS γ¯SDγ¯DEγeth + γ¯SE
e
− N0γ
e
th
PSγ¯SE
)
× N0
ωηNS γ¯SDPS ˜¯γI
NS−1∑
n=0
1
n!
(
N0γ
t
th
PS γ¯SD
)n
e
− N0γ
t
th
PSγ¯SD
×
n∑
n1=0
(
n
n1
)
(n1)!
(
PS γ¯SDωηNS ˜¯γI
ωηNS ˜¯γIN0γ
t
th +N0
)n1+1
, (15)
where ω = α/(1− α).
Proof: As has been described, wSD =
[w1, · · ·wn, · · ·wNS ]T is a normalized vector, i.e.,∑NS
n=1 |wn|2 = 1. Thus, |hSEwSD| is a unitary
transformation of hSE . Besides, it is obviously
that wSD is independent of hSE . Moreover, the
elements of hSE are all Gaussian variables, namely
hSnE ∼ N (0, γ¯SE) for n ∈ {1, 2, · · · , NS}. Therefore,
we can conclude that wnhSnE ∼ N
(
0, |wn|2γ¯SE
)
. Hence,∑NS
n=1 wnhSnE ∼ N
(
0,
∑NS
n=1 |wn|2γ¯SE
)
= N (0, γ¯SE),
which verifies that the unitary transformation does not change
the distribution of the transformed variables in hSE . As such,
the common term of wSD will not result in any correlation
between |hSDwSD| and |hSEwSD|. Therefore, γD and γE
are independent variables [38, 55, 56]. Hence, (14) can be
written as
PR&S =
[
1− PCO
(
γtth
)]
[1− PSO (γeth)] . (16)
By substituting (10) and (12) into (16) and (13) yields the
result in Theorem 1.
Theorem 1 provides an analytical expression for the secrecy
throughput of the system, which is in closed-form and does
not involve any special functions. As a result, it allows for fast
evaluation in popular mathematical software such as Matlab,
thereby providing an efficient way to access the secrecy
throughput of the system while avoiding the time-consuming
Monte Carlo simulations.
5IV. ASYMPTOTIC PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
To further exploit the insights from the secrecy performance,
the asymptotic analysis is conducted under two scenarios,
namely: (A) the scenario with high transmit SNR9, i.e.,
γS → ∞; and (B) the scenario with large amount of SIC,
i.e., θ →∞10.
A. The Scenario with γS →∞.
Lemma 3: The COP for the SWIPT and FD self-jamming
system with γS →∞ is derived as
P γS→∞CO = 1−
1
ωηNS γ¯SD ˜¯γI
NS−1∑
n=0
(
γtth
γ¯SD
)n
×
(
ωηNS ˜¯γI γ¯SD
ωηNS ˜¯γIγ
t
th + 1
)n+1
. (17)
Proof: For γS →∞, we have
γγS→∞D =
|hSDwSD|2
ωηNS γ¯SD
∣∣∣h˜I ∣∣∣2 . (18)
As (18) is similar to (5), hence (17) can be easily obtained by
following a similar proof as in Lemma 1.
Lemma 4: The SOP for the SWIPT and FD self-jamming
system with γS →∞ is given by
P γS→∞SO =
γ¯SE
ωηNS γ¯SDγ¯DEγeth + γ¯SE
. (19)
Proof: Under the scenario of γS →∞, we have
γγS→∞E =
|hSEwSD|2
ωηNS γ¯SD|hDE |2
. (20)
Following the similar proof as in Lemma 2, (20) is readily
derived.
Armed with the results in Lemmas 3 and 4, we proceed to
investigate the corresponding secrecy throughput performance.
Theorem 2: The secrecy throughput for the SWIPT and FD
self-jamming system with γS →∞ is given by
ςγS→∞=
Rs
1 + ω
NS−1∑
n=0
(
γtth
γ¯SD
)n(
ωηNS ˜¯γI γ¯SD
ωηNS ˜¯γIγ
t
th + 1
)n+1
× 1
ωηNS γ¯SD ˜¯γI
(
1− γ¯SE
ωηNS γ¯SDγ¯DEγeth + γ¯SE
)
.
(21)
Proof: By substituting (17) and (19) into (16) and (13)
easily yields the result in Theorem 2.
It is worth noting that Theorem 2 presents general closed-
form expressions of the asymptotic secrecy throughput which
remains sufficiently tight when γS → ∞ as will be demon-
strated in Section VI. Hence, this new analytical expression
provides an efficient way to characterize the impact of key
9The transmit SNR is defined as γS = PS/N0.
10We note that an amount of SIC up to 40 dB would satisfy this requirement
in this paper, which can be well supported by current passive SIC methods like
directional SIC, antenna separation and SIC, etc. These methods suppress the
self-interference by physical separation and thus do not consume any energy
[25, 31].
system parameters such as antenna number of the source,
distances between the nodes, and the amount of SIC on the
secrecy throughput of the system, without resorting to the
time-consuming Monte Carlo simulations.
B. The Scenario with θ →∞.
Lemma 5: The SOP for the SWIPT and FD self-jamming
system with θ → ∞ is the same as Eq. (12), while the COP
for the SWIPT and FD self-jamming system with θ → ∞ is
given by
P θ→∞CO = 1−
NS−1∑
n=0
1
n!
(
N0γ
t
th
PS γ¯SD
)n
e
− N0γ
t
th
PSγ¯SD . (22)
Proof: As can be readily observed, when θ → ∞, the
expression of γE remains unchanged. Hence, the SOP under
this scenario is the same as Eq. (12). As for the COP, we have
γθ→∞D =
PS
N0
‖hSDwSD‖2. (23)
To this end, the result in Eq. (22) could be extracted from (32)
by replacing x with γtth.
Based on the results in Lemma 5, we carry on studying the
corresponding secrecy throughput performance.
Theorem 3: The secrecy throughput for the SWIPT and FD
self-jamming system with θ →∞ is given by
ςθ→∞=
Rs
1 + ω
NS−1∑
n=0
1
n!
(
N0γ
t
th
PS γ¯SD
)n
e
− N0γ
t
th
PSγ¯SD
×
(
1− γ¯SE
ωηNS γ¯SDγ¯DEγeth + γ¯SE
e
− N0γ
e
th
PSγ¯SE
)
. (24)
Proof: By substituting (12) and (22) into (16) and (13),
we easily proved the result in Theorem 3.
We note that, the FD operation is designed to send self-
jamming signals. As a result, when HDNSJ scheme is applied,
there will be no need to split any time duration for harvesting
energy, which acts as the energy supply for the self-jamming
operation in our proposed scheme. Therefore, with α = 0 and
θ → ∞, our proposed SWIPT-FDSJ scheme can be easily
reduced to HDNSJ scheme. In other words, our proposed
scheme is more generalized, and the HD scheme without
self-jamming is a special case of our analysis. The reduced
expressions of SOP, COP and secrecy throughput for HDNSJ
scheme can be easily derived from (12), (22) and (24) by
letting ω = 0 (i.e., α = 0).
V. OPTIMAL TIME DURATION ALLOCATION
As mentioned previously, the time-switching ratio α is an
important parameter, which directly determines the effect of
the jamming protocol. We note that, there exists an optimal
α maximizing the system secrecy throughput. On one hand,
according to Eq. (8), a larger α indicates a higher jamming
power. Hence, the eavesdropper would generally be confused
and suppressed greater, thus the secrecy throughput will be
improved. On the other hand, a larger α also means the decline
of time duration allocated for data transmission, which in turn
leads to the decrease of the secrecy throughput. Thereby, it
6must be carefully designed according to the specific environ-
ment to achieve the best secrecy throughput performance.
Mathematically, the optimization problem could be written
as
ςmax = arg
α
max ς (α) , subject to : 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. (25)
Noting that α is monotonically increased with ω. Therefore,
the above problem could be reformulated as
ςmax = arg
ω
max ς (ω) , subject to : 0 ≤ ω <∞. (26)
Unfortunately, it is too involved to reveal the monotonicity
and convexity in Eq. (14) with respect to ω. In order to make
it traceable, we use the asymptotic result with θ →∞, namely
Eq. (24) instead. As a result, the optimization problem is
expressed as
ςmax = arg
ω
max ςθ→∞(ω), subject to : 0 ≤ ω <∞.
(27)
Theorem 4: The optimal value of time-switching ratio α
and the corresponding maximum secrecy throughput for the
SWIPT and FD self-jamming system with θ → ∞ are given
by (28) and (29), respectively
α∗ =
{
0, κ2 ≤ κ11+κ1
ω∗
1+ω∗ , κ2 >
κ1
1+κ1
, (28)
ςθ→∞max =gmaxRs
NS−1∑
n=0
1
n!
(
N0γ
t
th
PS γ¯SD
)n
e
− N0γ
t
th
PSγ¯SD , (29)
where
gmax =
{
(1− κ2) , κ2 ≤ κ11+κ1
1
1+ω∗
(
1− κ1κ2ω∗+κ1
)
, κ2 >
κ1
1+κ1
, (30)
with
ω∗ = −κ1 (1− κ2) +
√
κ1κ2 (1 + κ1κ2 − κ1)
κ1 =
γ¯SE
ηNS γ¯SD γ¯DEγeth
κ2 = e
− γ
e
th
γSγ¯SE
. (31)
Proof: See Appendix C.
It is highlighted that α∗ = 0 indicates that no energy is
harvested, and thus no jamming signal is exploited. Therefore,
α∗ = 0 actually degenerates to the conventional case with no
SWIPT and jamming. In other words, Theorem 4 gives the
application condition of the proposed scheme, namely κ2 >
κ1/(1 + κ1) , and at the same time provides the maximum
secrecy throughput of it when the condition is satisfied. We
note that the application condition is totally determined by the
transmit SNR, the antenna number of the source, the energy
conversion efficiency, and the average channel gains of both
the authorized and malicious links.
TABLE II
LIST OF KEY SIMULATION PARAMETERS
Parameters Values Parameters Values
NS 2 Rt 3 bits/s/Hz
Rs 2 bits/s/Hz η 0.6
α 0.5 N0 1
T0 1 dSD 1.5 m
dSE 1.5 m dDE 1.5 m
µ 2.7 θ 40 dB
.S (dB)
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C
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Proposed SWIPT-FDSJ.
Proposed SWIPT-FDSJ,.S !1.
Proposed SWIPT-FDSJ,3!1
/Reduced HDNSJ.
Simu.
3 = 20 dB,
30 dB,
40 dB.
Fig. 2. COP vs. γS with different θ under α=0.5, η=0.6, Rt=3, Rs=2,
NS=2.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this part, we present the numerical results to demon-
strate the impacts of various system parameters on the secure
performance of the SWIPT and FD self-jamming system. As
it is shown from these figures, the theoretical results are in
exact agreement with the numerical simulations, which show
the correctness of the analysis. Without any loss of generality,
the key simulation parameters are listed in Table II unless
otherwise stated.
Figs. 2 and 3 examine the impact of γS and θ on the COP
of the SWIPT and FD self-jamming system. As depicted in
these two figures, the COP first decreases significantly and
then reaches a performance floor with increasing γS and θ.
It is also found from Fig. 2 that the exact COP expression
in (10) matches the asymptotic result with θ → ∞ in (17)
very well in the low and medium regime of γS , and then
deviates it with approaching the other asymptotic expression
with γS → ∞, namely (22), when the transmit SNR is high
enough. Generally speaking, a larger amount of SIC is needed
to reach the performance floor when a larger transmit SNR is
provided. The similar phenomenon is also observed for θ in
Fig. 3.
Figs. 4 and 5 illustrate the COP and SOP of the SWIPT
and FD self-jamming system with different NS . As we can
see from Fig. 4, the COP is an increasing function of NS
and an obvious performance enhancement is achieved with
73 (dB)
0 10 20 30 40 50
C
O
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Proposed SWIPT-FDSJ,3!1
/Reduced HDNSJ.
Simu.
.S =20dB,
30dB,
40dB.
Fig. 3. COP vs. θ with different γS under α=0.5, η=0.6, Rt=3, Rs=2,
NS=2.
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3:
Fig. 4. COP vs. γS with different NS under α=0.5, η=0.6, Rt=3, Rs=2,
θ=40 dB.
the increase of NS . In addition, as in Fig. 2 and 3, Eqs. (17)
and (22) provide good approximations of the exact theoretical
result in the corresponding cases. On the contrary, we find in
Fig. 5 that the SOP goes an inverse trend when comparing
with COP. Although an improvement is also found when
NS grows, it is not as distinct as that in COP. It is worth
noting that, some meaningful insights are found from Fig. 2-5
when comparing the proposed SWIPT-FDSJ scheme with the
reduced HDNSJ scheme. Obviously, the introducing of FD
self-jamming has a negative impact on the COP performance,
which however becomes very slight with the increase of θ. By
contrast, the self-jamming operation has improved the SOP
performance significantly, as a distinct performance gap is
observed in Fig. 5 between the two group lines (blue and
red). Specifically, it is observed that in the HDNSJ scheme, it
.S (dB)
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Fig. 5. SOP vs. γS with different NS under α=0.5, η=0.6, Rt=3, Rs=2.
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Fig. 6. Secrecy throughput vs. θ with different NS and η under α=0.5,
Rt=3, Rs=2, θ=40 dB.
is useless to decrease the SOP by increasing NS . We note
that, in the considered passive eavesdropping scenario, the
legitimate nodes do not have the CSI of the eavesdropper,
so that beamforming methods could not be used to interfere
it as much as possible. However, in our proposed SWIPT-
FDSJ scheme, the SOP performance can be greatly boosted
by increasing NS .
Fig. 6 plots the secrecy throughput of the SWIPT and
FD self-jamming system for various NS and η. As can be
observed, the larger NS and η are, the larger the secrecy
throughput is. This is readily understandable, because a larger
NS or η indicates a larger power of jamming signal, so that
the eavesdropper is better confused. Furthermore, we see that
the secrecy throughput improves significantly with increasing
NS . By contrast, the enhancement with a larger η is almost
8,
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Fig. 7. Secrecy throughput vs. α with different γS and η under α=0.5,
Rt=3, Rs=2, θ=40 dB, NS=3.
ignorable.
TABLE III
VALUE OF κ2 − κ1/(1 + κ1) AND α∗
PS (dB) η κ2 − κ1/(1 + κ1) α∗
8
0.3 -0.1726 0
0.6 -0.0315 0
0.9 0.0664 0.1352
10
0.3 -0.0496 0
0.6 0.0916 0.2552
0.9 0.1895 0.3083
Fig. 7 plots the secrecy throughput of the SWIPT and FD
self-jamming system for various γS and η. In this figure, the
optimum condition of secrecy throughput in Theorem 4 is ver-
ified by presenting six curves, whose values of κ2−κ1/(1+κ1)
are listed in Table III. As can be expected, three curves
corresponding to γS=8 dB, η=0.3 and 0.6 and γS=10 dB,
η=0.3 are monotonically decreasing, which all satisfy the
condition of κ2 − κ1/(1 + κ1) ≤ 0. Whereas, the remaining
three curves satisfying κ2 − κ1/(1 + κ1) > 0 all go up at
first and then drop with the increase of α, indicating the
existence of an optimum point of α for maximizing the secrecy
throughput performance.
Fig. 8 plots the secrecy throughput of the SWIPT and FD
self-jamming system for various α. The optimum value of α
under the given parameters is α∗=0.6188. As shown in this
figure, the secrecy throughput varies with the changing of
α. Obviously, the secrecy throughput is not a monotonically
increasing function with α as it is generally the largest when
α=0.5 comparing to α=0.2 and 0.8. Furthermore, the secrecy
throughput achieves its maximum value when the optimum
value of α is applied, which is in exact agreement with
the result in Theorem 4. In addition, it is easy to observe
that the secrecy throughput performance of the proposed
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Fig. 8. Secrecy throughput vs. γS with different α . Rt=3, Rs=2, θ=40 dB,
NS=2.
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Fig. 9. Secrecy throughput vs. Rt and Rs/Rt with different γS . α=0.5,
θ=40.
SWIPT-FDSJ is much better than that of the reduced HDNSJ
scheme. In particular, the secrecy throughput of the reduced
HDNSJ scheme approaches to zero with the increase of γS .
By contrast, the secrecy throughput of the proposed SWIPT-
FDSJ scheme approaches to a performance floor, which again
indicates the superiority of our proposed SWIPT-FDSJ scheme
when compared to the reduced HDNSJ scheme.
Fig. 9 plots the secrecy throughput of the SWIPT and
FD self-jamming system for various Rt and Rs/Rt. It is
readily to observe that for a fixed value of Rs/Rt, the
secrecy throughput upgrades to its peak as Rt reaches its
optimal, and then goes downwards. This phenomenon could be
explained as follows. For a fixed value of Rs/Rt, increasing
Rt indicates a corresponding increase of Rs, which results
the increase of COP and the decrease of SOP ultimately.
9When a low Rt is used, increasing COP is not distinct so that
the secrecy throughput keeps increasing. However, after Rt
reaches the optimal value, the secrecy throughput falls because
the increase of COP becomes dominant, as it is hard for S−D
link to afford a reliable transmission any longer. Moreover,
subject to a fixed Rt which results to a constant COP, the
secrecy throughput with Rs/Rt is also a concave function,
following a similar trend with Rt. We note that, the peak of
secrecy throughput and the corresponding optimal point of
Rs/Rt both promote as a larger γS is provided.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, a new paradigm for safeguarding energy-
constrained SWIPT networks was presented and the secrecy
performance of the system was analyzed with the passive
eavesdropping. The main idea of the scheme was that, the
destination node harvested energy transmitted from the source
with the MRT protocol, and then utilized it to send jamming
signals to confuse the malicious eavesdropper. The exact
closed-form expressions of the COP, the SOP, and the secrecy
throughput were derived and their asymptotic analysis under
two scenarios were carried out. Moreover, the optimal time du-
ration allocation was conducted and the application condition
as well as the maximum secrecy throughput of the proposed
SWIPT-FDSJ scheme and its reduced HDNSJ scheme were
provided. The results depicted that the application condition
was totally determined by the system parameters, namely the
transmit SNR, the antenna number of the source, the energy
conversion efficiency, and the average channel gains of both
the authorized and malicious links. Besides, it was proved
that the secrecy throughput performance of the SWIPT-FDSJ
scheme is much better than the reduced HDNSJ scheme when
the application condition is satisfied.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Without loss of generality, we define γSD =
PS‖hSDwSD‖2/N0 , γJI = PJ
∣∣∣h˜I ∣∣∣2/N0 . As depicted in
[49], the CDF of γSD is as follows
FγSD (x) = 1−
NS−1∑
n=0
1
n!
(
N0x
PS γ¯SD
)n
e
− N0xPSγ¯SD . (32)
Obviously, the PDF of γJI can be expressed as
fγJI (y) =
N0
PJ ˜¯γI
e
− N0y
PJ ˜¯γI . (33)
According to (9), we have
FγD (x) =
∫ ∞
0
FγSD (x (y + 1)) fγJI (y) dy. (34)
By applying the binomial theorem [52] in (32), we derive
FγSD (x (y + 1)) = 1−
NS−1∑
n=0
1
n!
(
N0x
PS γ¯SD
)n
e
− N0xPSγ¯SD
×
n∑
n1=0
(
n
n1
)
yn1e
− N0xyPSγ¯SD . (35)

 h 

 h 

 g 

 g 
(a)
O O
O O 
 0 0h 
(b)  0 0h 
Fig. 10. h(ω) and g(ω) vs. ω with: (a) h(0) ≥ 0; (b) h(0) < 0.
Substituting (33) and (35) into (34), and with the aid of [53,
Eq.(3.381.4)], we obtain
FγD (x) = 1−
N0
PJ ˜¯γI
NS−1∑
n=0
1
n!
(
N0x
PS γ¯SD
)n n∑
n1=0
(
n
n1
)
× (n1)!
(
PJPS γ¯SD ˜¯γI
PJ ˜¯γIN0x+ PS γ¯SDN0
)n1+1
e
− N0xPSγ¯SD .
(36)
Replacing x with γtth, and recalling (8) yields the result in
Lemma 1.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
For the notation convenience, we denote γSE =
PS‖hSEwSD‖2
/
N0, γJE = PJ |hDE |2. As depicted in
[54, 55] and the proof of Theorem 1, γSE is an exponentially
distributed random variable and the CDF of which can be
written as
FγSE (x) = 1− e−
N0x
PSγ¯SE . (37)
In addition, the PDF of γJE is readily to be given by
fγJE (y) =
N0
PJ γ¯DE
e
− N0yPJ γ¯DE . (38)
Hence, the CDF of γE can be calculated as
FγE (x) =
∫ x
0
FγSE (x (y + 1)) fγJE (y) dy. (39)
Substituting (37) and (38) into (39), and after some simple
manipulations, the CDF of γE is obtained as
FγE (x) = 1−
PS γ¯SE
PS γ¯SE + PJ γ¯DEx
e
− N0xPSγ¯SE . (40)
Substituting (8) and (40) into (11) easily leads to the result in
Lemma 2.
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APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 4
For the better explanation, we denote
g (ω) =
1
1 + ω
(
1− κ1κ2
ω + κ1
)
. (41)
By taking the derivative of above equation, we obtain
dg (ω)
dω
= − h (ω)
(1 + ω)
2
(ω + κ1)
2 , (42)
where
h (ω) = [ω + κ1 (1− κ2)]2 + κ1κ2 (κ1 − 1− κ1κ2) . (43)
As we see, h(ω) is a quadratic function. Also, it is readily
observed that κ1 > 0 and 1− κ2 > 0. Thereby, it is the value
of h(0) that solely determines the trend of g(ω). For a better
comprehension, we plot the diagrams of h(ω) and g(ω) versus
ω in Fig. 10 under different cases of h(0) ≥ 0 and h(0) < 0.
We note, h (0) < 0 yields
κ2 >
κ1
1 + κ1
, (44)
and when κ2 > κ1/(1 + κ1),
dg(ω)
dω = 0 yields
ω∗ = −κ1 (1− κ2) +
√
κ1κ2 (1 + κ1κ2 − κ1). (45)
Based on the above analysis, the results in Theorem 4 could
be readily derived.
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